Abstract
As shown by extensive research on pre-decisional information distortion, the order in 47 which information arrives can bias its processing, whereby encountering early evidence 48 supporting a particular choice option shifts the interpretation of subsequent, ambiguous evidence 49 in its favor (see DeKay, 2015 , for an overview). It was suggested that the distortion is driven by 50 maximizing the consistency between old and new information (J Edward Russo take longer to give a positive answer to a question about a piece of textual information when 66 having a negative rather than positive pre-existing sentiment towards it. For instance, they take 67 longer to confirm that a sentence 'Internet makes you lonely.' is grammatically correct whenindividual words included therein can predict the subsequent stock returns. This motivated our 116 use of this data to construct experimental stimuli that subjects would find credible. 117
Crucially, but unknown to subjects, each investment opportunity was shown twice over 118 several trials of the study, once with and once without the transaction fee. We hypothesized that 119 the presence/absence of the fee, by inducing an initial negative/positive sentiment towards 120 investment, would affect the processing of positive vs. negative words (defined as per Loughran 121 & Mcdonald, 2011) . Specifically, we expected positive words to be easier to process and 122 interpret in those trials in which they were congruent with the initial positive information in the 123 form of the absence of the fee. This should manifest in decreased measures of mental effort in 124 the gathered eye-data, but an increased influence of positive words on subjects' beliefs, which 125 we elicit via an innovative paradigm based on anticipatory eye-movements (Santos & Kowler, 126 2017) . At the same time, the density hypothesis would suggest that in case of negative 127 information the analogous effect might be weaker or non-existent, i.e. that a negative initial 128 information in the form of the presence of the fee would not facilitate the processing of negative 129 information to the same extent, because different negative pieces of evidence (discouraging 130 investment) are not as readily associated with each other as positive ones. 131 Accordingly, our analysis plan was split into two parts. First, we tested the overall 132 'congruency effect' of the transaction fee, namely that positive words should be processed faster 133 relative to negative ones (in the sense of shorter eye fixation durations) when the former are 134 congruent and the latter incongruent with the positive early information in the form of the 135 absence of the fee, rather than when the fee is present, making negative words congruent and the 136 positive ones incongruent. Second, we decomposed the overall congruency effect of the fee on 137 fixation durations, testing it separately for positive and negative words, and expecting to find it 138 in case of the former but not the latter, as suggested by the density hypothesis. Additionally, 139 although existing research focused on the effect of congruency on the speed of processing, we 140 conducted an exploratory analysis to see whether or not our findings in terms of fixation duration 141 might be supported by pupil dilation measurement, a well-known alternative indicator of mental 142 effort (Beatty, 1982) . Similarly, our exploratory analysis of subjects' beliefs, inferred via 143 anticipatory eye-movements, was designed to investigate if the absence of fees would make the 144 decision-makers more sensitive to subsequent positive information, in the sense that the 145 proportion of positive words in the word cloud would have a stronger positive impact on their 146 inferred optimism about the subsequent return on the considered investment. 147
To further strengthen our findings, we also conducted a pre-registered replication of the 148 initial study, in which a positive premium was paid in the absence of the fee, in order to ensure 149 that such an event is indeed interpreted as 'positive' by our subjects, and that the congruency 150 effect of the fee, as well as the valence asymmetry in this respect, still holds in those 151 circumstances. A robust demonstration of this effect would imply that the pre-decisional 152 distortion of information is driven by the early information facilitating the processing of 153 subsequent congruent evidence, but that this process depends on the similarity between old and 154 new information. Thus, the pre-decisional 'distortion' could, in fact, be viewed as an adaptive 155 heuristic reducing information processing costs, rather than a detrimental decision bias. 156
Experiment 1 158

Method 159
Subjects. We recruited 106 students (mean age 27.9, 62 females) with normal or 160 corrected-to-normal eyesight at a large private university. Six subjects were excluded due to poor 161 eye-tracking calibration or data quality (no eye fixations registered in more than 50% of choice 162 trials). 163
Stimuli and Design. We used a custom-built Wolfram Mathematica script to scrape and 164 process 15337 'single-ticker' expert opinion articles published on seekingalpha.com (SA) 165
between January 2014 and October 2017 on the 20 largest S&P500 stocks. Such articles explain 166 whether a particular stock should be invested in and why. 167
For each stock and each monthly period within the overall timespan, we collected articles 168 on that stock from this period and extracted from them words classed as positive/negative 169 according to the Loughran and Mcdonald (2011) financial sentiment lexicon, which eliminated 170 words identifying the stock (e.g. 'iPad'). As a significant majority of words in the lexicon are 171 negative, we also included words that were not included there but were classed as positive 172 according to the alternative and widely used Harvard Psychosociological Dictionary (Harvard-173 IV-4). This ensured that the proportions of positive vs. negative words were on average 174 approximately equal across all word clouds shown to subjects (see below). 175
As shown by existing research (Chen et al., 2014) , the overall proportion of negative 176 words in SA articles published about a stock in the past can predict its return in the subsequent 177 trimester. More specifically, future abnormal returns (net of average market returns) were found 178 to be 0.379% lower when the fraction of negative words was 1% higher. Here, our aim was not 179 to predict returns, but to give subjects a sample of textual evidence that they might consideruseful for making such a prediction by themselves. Due to the practical requirements of an eye-181 tracking analysis, we wished to present subjects with relatively condensed stimuli, thus exposing 182 them to several pieces of relevant information within a short time-span of a single decision trial. 183 Accordingly, from each set of positive/negative words (extracted from SA articles about a given 184 stock published in a given month), we selected the most representative 50 words according to the 185 'term frequency-inverse document frequency' metric, commonly used by internet search engines, 186 whereby a word is ranked high if it appears often in a text sample relative to its frequency in the 187 whole corpus of data (in our case, all the SA articles we scraped). We matched the resulting set 188 of words to actual returns of the stock in NYSE in the previous and subsequent trimesters. For 189 instance, the set of sentiment words in March 2017 was matched to the returns in the first and 190 second trimesters of 2017. 191 In each of the 80 trials of the study, each subject was offered an investment opportunity 192 drawn from the above set, i.e. was shown the previous return and 50 representative expert 193 opinion words corresponding to some stock during a certain time period. The returns were shown 194 as whole numbers ('points'), each percentage point converted to 10 points. Additionally, the 195 subject was told if a transaction fee of 20 points must be paid on investment. If so, then a 196 decision to invest resulted in getting the point-equivalent of the return of the stock in the 197 subsequent trimester, minus the fee (otherwise, no fee was paid). A decision not to invest yielded 198 a fixed one-point reward, representing risk-free return, and deliberately set at a very low level to 199 represent the fact that interest rates on secure deposits in world's largest economies have been 200 close to zero in recent years. 201
Subjects begun with 1000 points and were paid an equivalent of 3 USD per 1000 points 202 accumulated on completion. The average payoff was 7 USD (subjects also received university 203 course credits), and the study took around 25 minutes. We randomly drew the set of 80 204 investment opportunities for each subject, ensuring that the average previous/subsequent returns 205 and the proportion of positive words across all trials were within 0.1 SD of their averages for the 206 whole set of seekingalpha.com data, i.e. all subjects received broadly similar opportunities 207 representative of the whole set of acquired data. 208
Crucially, we also ensured that each investment offered to a subject appeared twice over 209 the 80 trials, once with and once without the transaction fee, where the fee appeared in the 210 earlier/later of the two matched trials in exactly half of the trial-pairs, and at least 30 other trials 211 separated every two matched trials. While the repetition was unknown to subjects, we carefully 212 explained to them that the fee is drawn randomly, independently of expert opinions or returns. 213
Finally, we ensured that each subject had a chance to invest in each of the 20 stocks in our 214 dataset 4 times, with no overlap between the involved three-monthly periods across non-matched 215
trials. 216
Subjects learned the previous return and the fee, before seeing a cloud of sentiment words 217 and deciding to invest or not, moving to subsequent screens by pressing a key (Figure 1 ). 218
Compared with word clouds that subjects will have seen in day-to-day life, ours was 219 standardized to eliminate factors such as font size, color, or orientation that might have added 220 noise to the eye-tracking data. Specifically, the 50 words were all printed in the same font and 221 randomly arranged in a fixed-sized ellipse ('cloud'), the height/width of which was 222 approximately 80% of the screen. 223
We used numerical optimization to distribute the words in a way that minimized the 224 variance of the distances between adjacent words, i.e. to ensure that they were approximately 225 evenly distributed. On average, the distance between adjacent words was greater than in typically 226 seen word clouds, so as to allow for a reliable identification of the exact word a subject is 227 looking at. 228
[ Figure 1 here] 229
Following the decision, the subsequent return was revealed in a way that enabled 230 inferring the subject's expectations by studying their anticipatory eye-movements. Specifically, 231
we first displayed a horizontal axis, and 800 ms afterward a collection of characters above it, 232
where the position of the only character that was not upside down indicated the return (see 233 Figure 2 ). The reason for having all but one characters upside down, rather than the other way 234 round, was that this made the task of inferring the return harder for subjects. This, in turn, 235 motivated them to focus their search efforts on those sections of the axis where the correct 236 character was most likely, in their view, to occur. 237
[ Figure 2 here] 238
Procedure. The stimulus presentation software was programmed in Wolfram 239
Mathematica. Each subject was seated at a laptop with a 15.4-inch, 1280x720px screen, with an 240 SMI-RED250 eye-tracker attached underneath, set to 250Hz frequency. We conducted a five-241 point semi-automatic calibration and validation with maximum allowed deviation 0.5°. A 242 headrest ensured a distance between the subject's eyes and the device of approximately 70cm. 243
We used a luxometer to check that light intensity was equal across experimental sessions (all 244 conducted in the same lab location without natural light). The study was approved by the local 245 faculty research ethics committee. All words used in the study were translated from English into 246 the local language by a professional translator, and we verified that this preserved the original 247 word sentiment by asking 50 subjects in an online pilot survey to classify the individual 248 translated words as positive or negative. 249
Results
250
Manipulation checks. In the first instance, we wanted to check if subjects understood 251 the task and if the various parameters of the decision problem had the desired effect. To this end, 252
we estimated a mixed-effects binary logistic regression model with the investment decision as 253 the dependent variable (1 = 'invest'), and random subject intercept and slope effects to allow for 254 different observations of the same subject being correlated. 255
The model estimates in Table 1 would induce subjects to process opinions differently, depending on whether an opinion's 278 positive or negative sentiment is congruent with the presence or absence of the fee, in the sense 279 that both influence the decision in the same direction. Based on existing research, congruent 280 opinions should be processed faster, resulting in shorter gaze durations on positive words relative 281 to negative ones when the fee is absent rather than present, i.e. given positive rather than 282 negative early information. 283
To test this hypothesis, we computed the duration of looking at individual words across 284 all subjects and trials. We defined the looking duration as the total duration of successive eye 285 fixations on a word. Specifically, each word constituted a separate Area-of-Interest, constrained 286 by a rectangle centered around the word, with a constant height of 45px (approximately 1 0 of a 287 1280x720 screen at a 70cm viewing distance), and a variable width equal to the word width plus 288 a padding equal to the width of a single letter on each side (we used a monospaced font). Theminimum size of an AOI was 60x45px and the AOIs never overlapped, with the minimum 290 distance between an AOI and its nearest neighbor being at least 10px for 95% of the words. We 291 set the minimum required fixation duration to 120 ms, with a maximum dispersion of 45px( 2 ). If 292 a word was re-visited after seeing other words in the interim, we treated this as a separate 293 observation, but the results are robust to only including instances of looking at each word for the 294 first time. 295
Examining the basic descriptive statistics of gaze duration reveals that the average 296 duration of looking at negative words, across all subjects and trials, was 342 ms both with and 297 without the fee, while for positive words it equaled 336 ms in the absence of the fee vs. 340 ms 298
when it was present. In other words, at the aggregate level, the fee seems to increase the duration 299 of looking at positive words, while having no effect on the negative ones. 300
To assess the statistical significance of this observation, we analyzed the effect of the fee 301 on the duration of looking at positive and negative words, while controlling other factors that 302 might influence the time spent looking at individual words, such as their length or on-screen 303 position. This was to verify that the effect of the fee was not caused by a change in the 304 information search strategy, i.e. in how people decide which words to look at (e.g., by creating a 305 tendency to look at longer words, words that are closer to the center of the screen, etc.). Thus, we 306 wished to find out if the fee will have a different effect on the duration of looking at a word 307 depending on whether it is a positive or negative word, but given that other features of the word 308 that we control, such as its length, are the same in each case. 309
To this end, we estimated a mixed-effects linear regression in which the dependent 310 variable was the duration of looking at an individual word, defined as above. The model included 311 hierarchically nested random intercept and slope effects. Specifically, as each subject was 312 presented with an independently drawn random selection of investment opportunities, we treat 313 stimuli (trials) as nested under subjects, thus allowing for correlation between measures (e.g., 314
durations) of fixations made by a given subject in a given decision trial. Apart from indicators of 315 the sentiment of the word and of the presence of the fee, we aimed to include as controls all 316 variables that might influence the processing of individual words. 317
As seen in Table 2 , the control variable effects were largely as expected. consistent with existing research, looking durations seemed well-aligned with processing load. 337
[ Table 2 here] 338
More importantly for our hypotheses, in the absence of the fee (fee-present = 0) the 339 duration of looking at negative words was significantly larger than for positive ones, 340 βnegative=0.776*10^(-3), t(584) =5.196, p<.001 . This translates to a difference of approximately 9 341 ms before rescaling, which is larger than the 6 ms difference between the corresponding raw 342 averages reported above, because it measures the ceteris paribus effect, whereas positive words 343 were, on average, slightly longer than negative ones, thus taking longer to read. However, the 344 difference in the duration of looking at negative vs. positive words was significantly reduced 345 when the fee was present, βnegative*fee-present=-0.348*10^(-3), t(116)=-2.529, p=.013. Put it 346 differently, the effect of the fee on the duration of looking at negative words was significantly 347 smaller (more negative) than its effect on positive words. In particular, in case of positive words 348 (negative = 0), the effect of the fee was significantly positive, βfee-present=0.301*10^(-3), t(5622)= 349 2.465, p=.014, translating to approximately 4 ms. In contrast, re-estimating the regression in processing times, we also explored the possibility of obtaining analogous results using other 356 measures of cognitive effort. In particular, we estimated a second model, identical to the one in 357 Table 2 , except that instead of using looking duration as the dependent variable, we used peak 358 pupil dilation while fixating on a word, computed net of a baseline calculated for the 500 ms 359 white screen preceding the word cloud. This is a common measure of cognitive effort in reading 360 and listening studies (e.g. Hyona, Tommola, & Alaja, 1995; Zekveld, Heslenfeld, Johnsrude, 361
Versfeld, & Kramer, 2014). On average across all subjects/trials, the peak pupil dilation relative 362 to baseline when looking at negative words was 0.132 mm both with and without the fee, while 363 for positive words it equaled 0.133 mm with-and 0.124 mm without the fee. 364
The resulting mixed model estimates are relegated to the Appendix, Table A1 , due to 365 their exploratory and supplementary nature vis-à-vis the main analysis of looking duration. It is, 366 however, worth noting that they were generally similar to the results in Table 2 . Their most 367 important aspect was that the effect of the fee on the processing of positive words was 368 reproduced when using pupil dilation instead of looking duration, βfee-present=1.203*10^(-3), 369 t(6731)= 2.423, p=.015. However, the interaction between the fee and word sentiment was, in 370 this case, not significant, βnegative*fee-present=-0.945*10^(-3), t(5677)=-1.681, p=.093. As in the case 371 of looking duration, re-estimating the regression with a 'positive' dummy variable instead of the 372 'negative' one revealed that the analogous effect of the fee on pupil dilation while looking att(6367)= 0.467, p=.640. 375
Exploratory analysis of the effect of the fee on opinion interpretation and belief 376 updating. Finally, we wished to make sure that the observed changes in the perception of 377 positive words were indeed a sign of them becoming harder to interpret when incongruent, rather 378 than simply more important for the decision process. Thus, for each subject/trial, we computed 379 the average horizontal position of the eye in the 800 ms during which the return axis (but not yet 380 the return) was shown ( Figure 2 ). We used this as the dependent variable in our final 'by-trial' 381 mixed-effects model (Table 3) . 382
[ Table 3 here] 383
Based on existing research on anticipatory eye-movements, we assumed that prior to the 384 return being shown subjects would look further to the right if this is where they expect to find it, 385
i.e. when they are more optimistic about the stock's subsequent return. Thus, if the fee was 386 indeed making positive words harder to interpret rather than more important, then the effect of 387 the proportion of positive words in the word cloud on the dependent variable should be smaller 388 with the fee present rather than absent. The effect of the fee on pupil dilation and inferred beliefs 438
We also conducted two exploratory analyses to further support and help interpret the 439 above findings. First, as an alternative measure of cognitive effort, we used peak pupil dilation 440 while looking at individual words instead of looking duration, in an otherwise unchanged mixedmodel structure. We found that the fee increased pupil dilation while looking at positive words 442 but, once again, had no impact on the processing of negative ones, giving a further indication of 443 more effortful processing of positive words when incongruent with the fee. Nevertheless, these 444 supplementary findings should be interpreted with caution, subject to caveats which we later 445 discuss in the 'Scope and Limitations' section. 446
Second, through a trial-level mixed-model, we showed that the fee weakened the impact 447 of the proportion of positive words in the cloud on the subjects' optimism about the stocks' 448 subsequent returns inferred via anticipatory eye-movements. This suggests that, when 449 incongruent, positive words were harder to process and interpret, rather than more important for 450 the decision process (in which case their more effortful processing would yield greater, not 451 smaller, effect on beliefs). When more words in the cloud were positive rather than negative (the 452 proportion of positive words increased), these additional positive words were harder to interpret 453 in the presence than in the absence of fees, and thus contributed less to positive expectations of 454 future returns. 455
All in all, the results seemed to confirm our hypotheses, and are consistent with the idea 456 that early positive information can facilitate the processing of later positive evidence. 457
Specifically, positive information in the form of the absence of the fee decreased the gaze 458 duration and pupil dilation while later looking at positive opinions about the stock, at the same 459 time increasing the influence of these opinions on the subjects' optimism about subsequent 460 decision outcomes. 461
Experiment 2 462
Motivation for an additional replication study 463
Despite our different Experiment 1 measures and tests converging into a consistent 464 picture, it should be noted that the magnitudes of the observed effects were quite small. In 465 particular, the fee increased the duration of looking at positive words by just 4 ms on average, 466 i.e. by only slightly more than 1%. In the same vein, on the individual word-level, the estimated 467 impact of the fee on the duration of looking on positive words was just a small fraction of the 468 difference in this respect between a very long and a very short word, or roughly a third of the 469 difference between a word located at the center of the screen and one placed at the peripheries of 470 the word cloud. 471
On the one hand, this is not surprising, since physical, objective, and readily accessible 472 features of the stimuli are bound to have more impact on their visual processing than factors that 473 might have engendered subjective psychological predispositions towards the stimuli in some of 474 the observers. On the other hand, the small observed sizes of the hypothesized effects made it 475 essential to replicate our initial findings in another experiment, possibly with slight adjustments 476 in the design to eliminate potential confounds. In particular, we could not be entirely sure that the 477 absence of the fee was perceived by the subjects as a positive (rather than neutral) event. 478
Similarly, the fact that negative early information stemmed from the presence of an event, while 479 positive information was based on its absence could also be considered a problem. 480 Accordingly, we conducted a replication of Experiment 1, pre-registered on OSF, (link: 481 https://osf.io/t8mbc/?view_only=4a36eb6e609c4728a631f7be949d7d2a), in which in place of the 482 absence of the fee subjects received a positive premium of the same value as the fee. That is, 483 while in Experiment 1 the adjustment applied to the stock return in the event of investment waseither '0' (fee-present = 0) or '-20' (fee-present = 1), in Experiment 2 it was either '+20' or '-20' 485 (where, for consistency, in describing the results we use the same dummy variable notation as 486 before, except now fee-present = 0 means that a +20 adjustment was in place, whereas fee-487 present = 1 still means a -20 adjustment). In both experiments, the value of the adjustment in a 488
given trial was communicated to subjects in exactly the same way, prior to seeing the word 489 cloud. That is, the only change compared with Experiment 1 was that '0' was replaced with 490 '+20'. 491
Our pre-registered hypotheses comprised the replication of the effects of the fee reported 492 in Experiment 1, via an unchanged set of mixed-model analyses. 493
Method 494
Subjects. A statistical power analysis was performed for sample size estimation, based 495 on data from Experiment 1. However, due to difficulties in conducting power analysis in a 496 mixed-model setting, we based it on a simple test of our main effect on the aggregate (subject) 497 level. Specifically, for each subject, we calculated the difference in average gaze duration on 498 positive vs. negative words, separately for when the fee was present vs. absent. The resulting 499 paired Wilcoxon test of the effect of the fee yielded an effect size of d = 0.295. With an alpha = 500
.05 and power = 0.80, the projected sample size needed with this effect size (based on GPower 501 3.1) was 97. With this in mind, we aimed to recruit up to 120 students for Experiment 2, so that 502 the final sample after exclusions would not fall below this threshold. 503
The experiment was conducted at the same location as Experiment 1. A total of 118 504 students volunteered for the study, of which we excluded 15 due to having previously taken part 505 in Experiment 1, poor eye-tracking calibration or data quality (no eye fixations in more than 50%of choice trials). This left a final sample of 103 subjects (mean age 26.7, 66 females), all of 507 whom had normal or corrected-to-normal eyesight and did not take part in Experiment 1. 508
Stimuli and Design. Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, apart from a single 509 exception. Specifically, in those trials in which the fee was absent (fee-present = 0), subjects who 510 chose to invest received a payoff adjustment on top of the stock's returns equal to '+20' 511 (compared with '0' in Experiment 1 and '-20' in the fee-present = 1 condition in both 512 experiments). In line with this change, the 'transaction fee:' caption in the initial decision screen 513 (Figure 1 , top) was replaced with a more general 'payoff adjustment' caption. In all other 514 respects, the adjustment was still communicated to subjects in the same way and, in particular, 515 prior to the word cloud being shown. 516
Results
517
In terms of the overall descriptive statistics, the average duration of looking at negative 518 words, across all subjects and trials, was 329 ms both with and without the fee, while for positive 519 words it equaled 327 ms in the absence of the fee (the +20 condition) vs. 332 ms when it was 520 present. Thus, compared with Experiment 1, subjects' fixations were slightly shorter, but once 521 again the fee seemed to increase the duration of looking at positive words, while having no effect 522 on the negative ones. In addition, the overall number of fixations per trial was reduced by 523 approximately 15% compared with Experiment 1. This was probably caused by the fact that with 524 the payoff adjustment now being either -20 or +20 (instead of 0 or +20), learning which of these 525 alternatives occurred provided subjects with a stronger cue as to which choice is optimal, thus 526 making the subsequent word cloud less important. This resulted in a tendency to read fewer 527 words and spend less time reading those that were looked at.structure to the ones used to analyze the data from Experiment 1 (with the exception of excluding 530 the insignificant 'sentiment-prevalence' control variable). The first model (Table A2) The second model (Table A3) Finally, the third model (Table A4) to only using observations from trials in which subjects chose to invest in the stock. 552
General Discussion 553 554
The overall picture that we obtained is that the presence of the fee influences the 555 processing of subsequent positive vs. negative information. This occurred regardless of whether 556 a positive premium was paid in the absence of the fee (Experiment 2) or not (Experiment 1). 557
Either way, the absence of the fee was apparently seen by the subjects as a positive event and 558 facilitated the processing of subsequent opinion words congruent with its valence (that is, 559 positive) relative to the incongruent negative words. This was manifested in the fact that, in the 560 absence of the fee, positive words were read faster than when it was present (both in absolute 561 terms and relative to negative words), and yet had a greater impact on the subjects' beliefs. At 562 the same time, no effect of the fee on the processing of negative words was found. 563
In our view, these findings create a link between existing research showing the pre-564 decisional distortion as the product of maximizing the consistency between old and new 565 information (J Edward Russo et al., 2008) , and the work centered around the density hypothesis 566 (Unkelbach et al., 2008) . On the one hand, research on information distortion demonstrated that 567 early information supporting a particular choice option can distort the interpretation of 568 subsequent evidence, with evidence in favour of the leading option being seen as stronger and 569 more unambiguously supportive of that option ('pro-leader distortion'), and evidence supporting 570 the trailing option being seen as weaker and less strongly in its favour ('anti-trailer distortion'). 571
The two types of distortion are typically symmetric (Blanchard, Carlson, & Meloy, 2014; dominating in certain contexts (Nurek, 2014) . It seems likely that evidence that is more 574 ambiguous and weaker would also be more difficult to process, requiring more cognitive effort. 575
Thus, the fact that, in our study, we see positive words being processed more effortfully in the 576 presence of fees, with a smaller effect on beliefs, could mean that we observe the attentional 577 correlates of information distortion. What this contributes to the information distortion literature 578 is that most, if not all of this existing research is based on tracing the subjects' cognitive 579 processes by directly and repeatedly asking them about their preferences and interpretation of 580 each piece of evidence. As acknowledged by Russo (2014) , it cannot be ruled out that this belief 581 elicitation procedure could itself drive the distortion, e.g. subjects who volunteered an opinion 582 favourable to an option could feel bound to interpret subsequent evidence accordingly, to avoid 583 openly contradicting their previous judgments. In contrast, in our case direct belief elicitation is 584 absent, and yet we do observe patterns consistent with information distortion in the subjects' 585 eye-data. 586
What should also be noted is that the distinction between pro-leader and anti-trailer 587 distortions is not analogous to our positive/negative dichotomy. Specifically, the equivalent of a 588 pro-leader distortion in our case would be if positive words become easier to interpret ('more 589 positive') in the absence of fees, while negative ones become easier to interpret with the fees 590 present. In contrast, an anti-trailer distortion would occur if negative words become 'less 591 negative' in the absence of fees and positive words become 'less positive' in their presence. 592
Thus, observing an effect consistent with both types of distortion for positive words, but no 593 effect for negative words, neither supports nor contradicts the previous reports of a symmetry 594 evidence, and particularly its valence, could determine its potential to cause an information 597 distortion. Bringing the two mentioned strands of literature together, this role of information 598 valence is, in turn, well explained by existing research on evaluative priming, and specifically 599 the density hypothesis. As argued by Alves, Koch, and Unkelbach (2017a), human preferences 600 towards most attributes relevant to their life are single-peaked (that is, a positive range is located 601 in the middle of an attribute dimension, flanked by two negative ranges toward the two ends of 602 the dimension). With extremity being, in general, negative, and moderation positive, the 603 moderate (positive) pieces of information tend to lie closer together on average than the extreme 604 (negative) ones. 605
The consequence of this tendency is that positive information ends up being, loosely 606 speaking, more densely packed in the associative network of the mind (hence the name of the 607 hypothesis), allowing for easier and faster associations between different pieces of positive 608 information. As shown by Unkelbach et al. (2008) , preceding a positive target stimulus with a 609 positive prime object facilitates classifying the target as positive, but this priming effect is 610 stronger than when preceding a negative target with a negative prime to elicit a negative 611 response. In our case, a positive initial information in the form of the absence of fees (and the 612 positive early sentiment to investment that it induces) might facilitate classifying positive 613 opinion words as positive. Introducing the fee (i.e., negative early information) might take this 614 advantage away from positive words, without transferring it to negative ones, because a negative 615 initial sentiment is not as readily connected to or associated with negative expert opinions. 616
This asymmetry could have important consequences for our understanding of the pre-617 decisional information distortion. It suggests that the goal of achieving consistency between oldand new information, previously shown to be a major driver of this phenomenon, could be more 619 readily achieved by the brain when positive rather than negative information arrives early on. 620
Importantly for both the evaluative priming and information distortion literatures, 621 existing research in these areas is based predominantly on tasks in which the chosen answers 622 have little or no direct consequence for the subjects, like rating pictures or statements (even in 623 studies of information distortion in risky choices, e.g. J.E. Russo & Yong, 2011, subjects 624 typically receive a certain, fixed payment). In contrast, here, we showed that the same human 625 biases continue to hold in incentivized economic decisions based on real-world data, despite 626 subjects then being motivated to behave in a thoughtful, non-heuristic manner. The fact that this 627 occurs in a financial context could help explain a number of well-documented phenomena in this 628 domain, like the fact that people underreact to negative news about investments they previously 629 made based on earlier positive signals (Frazzini, 2006; Odean, 1998) , or that investors update 630 their beliefs more strongly and more accurately based on positive rather than negative 631 information (Kuhnen, 2015) . 632
But perhaps the most important insight from our results is that the pre-decisional 633 distortion could be interpreted and explained via the 'error management theory' (Johnson, 634 Blumstein, Fowler, & Haselton, 2013), which posits that cognitive biases can be advantageous, 635 having evolved as the optimal way to manage errors under cognitive and ecological constraints. 636
In particular, we found that, when the fees were present, the proportion of positive words among 637 opinions about the stock had less influence on the subjects' inferred optimism about the 638 subsequent investment return. Thus, as coherently evidenced by the looking duration, pupil 639 dilation, and inferred beliefs data, positive initial information in the form of the absence of fees 640 appeared to facilitate the processing and interpretation of subsequent positive opinions, whichwere processed faster, with less cognitive effort, but more influence on beliefs. However, having 642 no analogous adverse effect on the processing of negative opinions, the positive early 643 information increased the overall sensitivity of the subjects' beliefs to word cloud composition. 644 Thus, our work offers further process-tracing support for the view that information distortion 645 processes may be adaptive (DeKay, 2015) . In particular, the primacy of early information in 646 determining decision outcomes, on which existing work on pre-decisional distortion focuses, 647 could, in fact, be only a by-product of a mechanism which evolved to reduce the cost of the 648 decision process, and in which valence asymmetries play a key part. 649
Scope and Limitations 650
Despite their interesting potential implications, our design and analyses come with 651 significant caveats and limitations that must be considered. To begin with, in real-world financial 652 markets, transaction fees are usually higher for investments with higher average returns. In 653 contrast, before the start of both of our experiments, we carefully explained to subjects that the 654 presence of the fee was determined at random, independently of the returns. Despite this, we 655 cannot completely rule out that some subjects would nevertheless expect poor returns when the 656 fee was absent. In this scenario, the less effortful processing of positive words in the absence of 657 fees could be due to positive opinions being dismissed by subjects as contrary to their negative 658 expectations. This, however, could not explain the increased sensitivity of inferred beliefs to the 659 proportion of positive opinions in the cloud. Thus, while we cannot rule it out completely, we 660 consider this scenario to be both unlikely and, in contrast with the density hypothesis, unable to 661 account for all of our results. 662
At the same time, an interesting question for future research would be to try to separate 663 the direct, ceteris paribus effect of the fee on the propensity to invest from its indirect effect dueto moderating the processing of subsequent evidence. Existing literature on information 665 distortion approaches this via mediation analyses, with the effect of initial information on final 666 choices mediated by measures of information distortion that occurred 'in between' (DeKay, 667
Stone, & Miller, 2011; Miller et al., 2013) . In our case, such an analysis is prevented by the fact 668 that we would need to compute a single numerical measure of how distorted the processing of a 669
given word cloud has been. As subjects' scanpaths are highly idiosyncratic and endogenous, it is 670 impossible to acquire a benchmark indicating how the same sequence of words would have been 671 examined in the absence of early information about the fees (equivalent to average ratings of 672 each piece of evidence provided by control group subjects in existing information distortion 673 studies). At the same time, our analysis of inferred expectations does suggest that the distortion 674 of subsequent information (words) could mediate the effect of early information (fee) on choice. 675
Specifically, subjects are clearly informed that fees are determined at random, irrespective of 676 future returns. Thus, the only way in which the presence of the fee could influence expected 677 returns is, in theory, via its effect on the processing of the words. The fact that we do observe a 678 significant relationship between the fee and subjects' expectations suggests, therefore, that the 679 fee could influence choices via an indirect as well as direct route, causing a distortion in the 680 processing of subsequent information affecting expectations on which choices, in turn, are based. 681
Nevertheless, allowing for a full-blown mediation analysis within the current setting, i.e. without 682 direct elicitation of beliefs, would be a potentially very useful design improvement. 683
Other issues that should be considered are of a more technical nature, and are related to 684 the pupil dilation analysis. First, there is a question of whether the pupil can respond to the 685 sentiment of a word before the gaze is transferred to the next one. Classic studies reported pupil 686 latencies under 300 ms in cognitive tasks (Ahern & Beatty, 1979) , while recent experiments inreading and lexical decision tasks demonstrated that the peak pupil latency can be significantly 688 higher (note, however, that this may be due to the need to execute a response after each word, 689 unlike in our study; see e.g. Haro, Guasch, Vallès, & Ferré, 2017) . On the one hand, 690 approximately half of the looking durations that we registered were below 300 ms. On the other 691
hand, it appears that the number of long fixations was sufficiently large to allow for significant 692 pupil dilation results despite the noise brought about by the uninformative short fixations. At the 693 same time, the fact that we might have been able to register only the very early phase of 694 pupillary response could explain its small magnitude relative to classic studies in which exposure 695 to the stimuli is much longer, and the differences in pupil dilation are closer to 0.1mm (e.g. 696 Beatty, 1982) . 697
The second, closely related issue affecting the pupil dilation analysis is that pupil dilation 698 could 'lag behind' the eye-movements, leading to order-dependence and autocorrelation between 699 the present and past observations. From the statistical point of view, this is controlled by the 700 clustering of observations by trial within the mixed models. The fact that subjects cannot infer 701 the sentiment of the word prior to reading it, and hence cannot choose the order in which to read 702 positive vs. negative words (which are thus effectively sampled at random), ensures that the issue 703 in question increases noise rather than constituting a systematic confound. In connection with the 704 pupil latency issue above, it may be that seeing two or more words of the same positive or 705 negative valence in succession triggers a pupillary response that only becomes registered and 706 assigned to the words that are close to the end of the sequence. This could be enough to lead to 707 overall differences in pupillary responses to positive vs. negative words, depending on the 708 presence of the fee. 709 realism and control. On the one hand, the simultaneous presentation of all opinions in a word 711 cloud makes it possible to study the way in which people examine evidence when able to freely 712 explore its various elements and choose the duration of each examination, as they do in the real 713 world. On the other hand, this gives us less control over the order and timing of the processing of 714 different pieces of information by our subjects, making it harder to interpret the obtained process 715
data. An improved balance between these two aspects of the tradeoff may be found in future 716 research. 717
Conclusions 718
We used eye-tracking in a laboratory stock trading experiment to study the cognitive 719 mechanisms behind the phenomenon of pre-decisional distortion of information. We found 720 evidence suggesting that transaction fees inducing a negative initial sentiment towards 721 investment made subsequent positive opinions about stocks harder to process, with increased 722 cognitive effort manifested in larger gaze duration and pupil size. Despite this increased effort, 723 positive opinions then had a smaller effect on beliefs. In a pre-registered follow-up study, we 724 replicated these findings in a setting in which, in the absence of fees, the payoff adjustment was 725 strictly positive rather than equal to zero. 726 Interestingly, our process-tracing analysis also demonstrated that a positive vs. negative 727 valence asymmetry, widely documented in evaluative priming, semantic, person perception, and 728 related tasks, extends to incentivized economic choices. In particular, the presence of the 729 transaction fee affected the processing of positive, but not negative opinions, in line with the 730 density hypothesis, which posits greater associative links between positive than between negative 731 pieces of information.Importantly, the fact that the processing of positive information could be facilitated by 733 earlier exposure to positive evidence without hindering that of negative information suggests that 734 the overweighting of early evidence seen in studies of pre-decisional distortion might be a 735 signature of an adaptive heuristic rather than a detrimental decision bias. More specifically, the 736 pre-decisional distortion might be driven by a tendency to reduce the information processing 737 costs, by exploiting similarities, between or within certain categories of data, prevalent in the 738 information ecology that humans operate in. From this perspective, our demonstration of the fact 739 that valence asymmetries matter for information integration in fully incentivized choices is also 740 significant. It suggests that the said focus on the processing costs is present not just in choices of 741 no direct consequence for the decision-makers (like rating pictures or words), but also in ones in 742 which they have a vested interest and an incentive to choose carefully. Thus, valence 743 asymmetries present in pre-decisional integration of information could have important real-world 744 implications. 745 Table 1 . 885 
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